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Managing Intrinsic Motivation in a Long-Run
Relationship∗
Kfir Eliaz† and Ran Spiegler‡
June 23, 2014
Abstract
We study a repeated principal-agent interaction, in which the principal oﬀers
a "spot" wage contract at every period, and the agent’s outside option follows a
Markov process with i.i.d shocks. If the agent rejects an oﬀer, the two parties
are permanently separated. At any period during the relationship, the agent is
productive if and only if his wage does not fall below a "reference point" (by more
than an infinitesimal amount), which is defined as his lagged-expected wage in
that period. We characterize the game’s unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
The equilibrium path exhibits an aspect of wage rigidity. The agent’s total
discounted rent is equal to the maximal shock value.
1 Introduction
The standard principal-agent model is built on the premise that the agent needs to be
incentivized in order to exert eﬀort on a task. This requires the principal to condition
the agent’s wage on a verifiable signal of his eﬀort. However, in many environments
such information is either unavailable or very imprecise, which forces the principal to
rely on the agent’s “intrinsic motivation”. For instance, when a parent hires a nanny,
many of the eﬀects of good care are unobservable. Similarly, if one wishes to implement
eﬀective care by a surgeon, forcing her to stick to some protocol will often miss the
target, and the eﬀects of a good surgery are confounded with other factors and therefore
hard to contract on. Even when it is relatively easy to check whether the task itself
was completed successfully - say, flying a plane from point A to point B on schedule
- it may be diﬃcult to discern whether disruptions in performance could have been
∗We thank Yair Antler, Alex Frug and Eeva Mauring for helpful comments. Financial support
from the Sapir Centre and ERC grant no. 230251 is gratefully acknowledged.
†Tel Aviv University and University of Michigan. E-mail: kfire@post.tau.ac.il.
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avoided (e.g., unnecessarily delaying a flight due to a malfunction that the pilot could
have fixed himself).1
Intrinsic motivation is inherently a dynamic property - an agent who is initially mo-
tivated may temporarily lose his motivation in the course of his relationship with the
principal. In particular, numerous studies in the literature - notably, Akerlof (1982),
Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Bewley (1999), Fehr et al. (2009) - have argued that in-
trinsic motivation is reference-dependent. An agent may become demotivated when
his compensation falls below his expectations. This means that temporal variations
in the agent’s compensation, which may reflect variations in his outside option, can
adversely aﬀect the agent’s motivation. Hence, in situations with limited contractual
instruments, the principal is faced with the problem of optimally managing the agent’s
motivation: trading-oﬀ the cost and benefit of keeping the agent motivated.
To study this dynamic principal-agent problem, we propose a simple model in which
the agent is motivated whenever his current wage does not fall significantly below some
reference point. The agent enters every period in the principal-agent relationship with
some "reference wage" et, and the principal makes a "spot" wage oﬀer wt. That is,
the principal is unable to commit to a wage strategy ex-ante, and he is unable to
condition the wage on any verifiable signal. If the agent declines, the two parties
are permanently separated, and the agent receives at every period s ≥ t a publicly
observed outside payment θt, which evolves according to some Markov process. Both
parties maximize their discounted expected payoﬀs. If the agent accepts the oﬀer, his
output is reference-dependent. His output is 1 if wt ≥ et − λ (where λ > 0) and 0
otherwise. Our entire analysis focuses on the λ→ 0 limit.
To complete the model, we need to specify the rule that governs the evolution of
the reference wage et. Inspired by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that at every
t, et is equal to the agent’s lagged-expected wage - that is, the "rational" expectation
of wt calculated at the end of period t − 1 according to the parties’ continuation
strategies, and conditional on the event that the relationship is not severed at t. The
expectation-based component of the reference captures the idea that a wage is treated
as a disappointment or as a pleasant surprise, depending on how it compares with the
agent’s former expectations: even when the wage rises relative to the previous period,
the agent may still be disappointed if he expected a big raise. The lagged-expectations
aspect of the reference point captures the idea that reference points are sluggish in
adapting to new information. In this respect, reference points are like habits, which
1See the post "Incomplete Contracts and Labor Disputes" at
http://cheaptalk.org/2012/10/04/incomplete-contracts-and-labor-disputes/.
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often take time to change in the face of new circumstances.
Our task is to characterize subgame perfect equilibria in this game. In particular,
we want to understand the implications of the agent’s reference-dependent intrinsic
motivation on the structure of the equilibrium wage and the agent’s rent. To illustrate
the possible eﬀects of reference dependence, consider perfectly myopic parties. This
means that the agent’s participation wage at period t is θt. Assume that θt can take
two values, θ and θ, with equal probability (independently of the history), where θ <
θ < 1. Suppose that in equilibrium the parties’ relationship is not severed at t for
any realization of θt. Let w(θ) denote the equilibrium wage when θt = θ. Then,
et = 12w(θ) +
1
2
w(θ). If the principal paid the agent his reference wage in equilibrium,
we would have e = 1
2
θ + 1
2
θ > θ. If λ is small, the agent will produce zero output
when θt = θ. Therefore, it would be profitable for the principal to deviate to wt = e in
the state θ. In fact, the only wage strategy that is consistent with equilibrium in the
λ→ 0 limit is w(θ) = w(θ) = θ.
The equilibrium strategy in this example has two noteworthy features: (i) wage
rigidity - the wage is invariant to the fluctuations in the agent’s outside option; (ii)
eﬃciency wages - the principal pays the agent a wage above the reservation level in
order to ensure high output. The example thus naturally links the two phenomena
together. Note that the eﬃciency wage eﬀect does not arise from a conventional in-
centive constraint, but from the desire not to disappoint the agent and rob him of his
intrinsic motivation.
When parties are not myopic, a new consideration arises: the eﬃciency-wage eﬀect
means that the agent expects to earn rents in the future, and this lowers his current
reservation point. Since this wage in turn determines the equilibrium reference wage,
finding the equilibrium wage strategy requires us to find a fixed point of a coupled pair
of functional equations: the dynamic reservation-wage equation after every history,
and the equation that defines the reference wage after every history. From a technical
point of view, this novel fixed-point constitutes the paper’s core.
This note follows up Eliaz and Spiegler (2013), which essentially embedded a more
elaborate version of the above myopic case in a search-matching model of the labor
market (eﬀective myopia arose from a short horizon of the employment relation, rather
than from a zero discount factor), and derived implications for patterns of wage rigid-
ity, endogenous job destruction and enhanced volatility of labor-market tightness. The
technical challenge in Eliaz and Spiegler (2013) arose from the assumption that when
workers contemplate declining an oﬀer, they anticipate the possibility of being re-
matched with a new employer in the future. The present note abstracts from re-
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matching and focuses instead on the pure principal-agent problem, and on the new
considerations that arise from the infinite horizon of the principal-agent relationship.
Re-incorporating a model along these lines in a larger search-matching model of the
labor market is an important challenge for future research.
The idea that an agent’s productivity in a task depends directly on his beliefs
has precedents in the theoretical literature. Compte and Postlewaite (2004) analyze a
model in which the agent’s ability to complete a task depends on his subjective belief
regarding this ability (namely, his "confidence"). They show that in such a model,
biased beliefs can enhance welfare. Similarly, Fang and Moscarini (2005) show that
when an agent’s performance depends on his confidence, an informed principal may
prefer to design a wage scheme that does not diﬀerentiate between abilities.
2 A Model
Two players, referred to as a principal and an agent, play a discrete time, infinite-
horizon game with perfect information. At the beginning of every period t = 1, 2, ...,
the principal makes a wage oﬀer wt ∈ R. If the agent rejects the oﬀer, the relationship
is terminated, and the agent (principal) collects a payoﬀ of θs (0) at every period s ≥ t.
We assume that θt = Ψ(θt−1) + εt, where Ψ is a deterministic function and εt is i.i.d
according to a cdf F with mean zero. Let ε¯ denote the highest value that εt can
take. We assume that Ψ and F are such that θt always takes values in (0, 1). If the
agent accepts the oﬀer at period t, he collects a payoﬀ wt, and the principal’s payoﬀ is
yt = 1(wt ≥ et − λ) − wt, where λ > 0 and et is the agent’s reference point at period
t. We refer to yt as the agent’s output in period t. Both parties maximize discounted
expected payoﬀs, with a discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
For every period t in which the agent is employed, let ht denote the history of
realized wages, output and the outside option up to and including period t, i.e. ht =
(ws, ys, θs)ts=1. The history is commonly observed by both players. However, the agent’s
output is unverifiable, which is why the principal cannot condition the agent’s wage on
his output. A strategy for the principal is a function w that specifies a wage oﬀer for
every history ht−1 and realized outside option θt. A strategy for an agent is a function a
that specifies for every (ht−1, θt) and wage oﬀer wt a binary decision: “accept” (a = 1)
or “reject” (a = 0).
To complete the description of the game, we need to specify how et is formed.
Inspired by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that it is the agent’s lagged-expected
wage at period t. More precisely, consider a history at the end of period t − 1 (i.e.,
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before θt is realized), and fix the parties’ continuation strategies from period t onwards.
Then, et is the expectation of wt, calculated according to these continuation strategies
at the end of the period-(t−1) history, conditional on the event that the agent accepts
the principal’s oﬀer at period t. (If this is a null event, we set et = 0.) Thus, et
- and therefore the principal’s payoﬀ at period t - is a function of the expectations
that players hold at the end of period t − 1. In equilibrium, these expectations will
be correct. Given a strategy pair (w, a), we let e denote the function that assigns for
every history ht−1 a reference wage for period t.
Since the principal’s payoﬀ is defined in terms of the players’ beliefs, this is not
strictly speaking an extensive game, but an extensive psychological game, in the sense
of Geanakopolos, Pearce and Stachetti (1989). However, since the belief-dependence is
straightforward, we will work with the usual and familiar subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) concept, which can be defined in terms of the usual single-deviation property:
in equilibrium, each player’s action at every history maximizes his discounted expected
payoﬀs, given the continuation strategies of both players. More formally, an SPE in
our game is a triple (w, a, e) that satisfies the following properties after every his-
tory (ht−1, θt). First, given (w, a, e), the wage w(ht−1, θt) maximizes the principal’s
discounted sum of expected payoﬀs. Second, for every wage oﬀer wt, the decision
a(ht−1, θt, wt) maximizes the agent’s discounted sum of expected payoﬀs. Third, given
the principal’s strategy w and the agent’s strategy a, the reference function e satisfies
e(ht−1) = E[w(ht−1, θt)|a(ht−1, θt, w(ht−1, θt)) = 1]
and e(ht−1) = 0 if the event {θt | a(ht−1, θt, w(ht−1, θt)) = 1} is null.
3 Analysis
Let us first consider a reference-independent benchmark model, in which the agent’s
output is always 1, independently of the history. (In other words, set λ =∞.)
Claim 1 Let λ =∞.Then, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium: the agent’s
accepts any wt ≥ θt at every period t, and the principal oﬀers wt = θt at every t,
independently of the history.
This is a standard result due to the principal having all the bargaining power.
Therefore, the proof is omitted. The equilibrium wage is entirely flexible and the agent
earns no rent in equilibrium.
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We now provide a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium in the λ → 0
limit, where the agent becomes unproductive whenever the actual wage falls below his
reference point, however slightly.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique SPE in the λ→ 0 limit. At every period t, following
any history:
(i) The principal oﬀers wt = Ψ(θt−1) + (1− δ)ε¯.
(ii) The agent accepts any wt ≥ θt − δε¯.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we use ht−1 to denote a history (θs, ws)s=1,...,t−1, where
θs is the realized outside option in period s and ws is the wage oﬀer that the principal
made in period s, such that the agent accepted all wage oﬀers up to period t− 1. We
denote by (ht−1, θt) the immediate concatenation of ht−1, right after θt is realized. With
slight abuse of notation, we use F (θt+1 | θt) to denote the cdf over θt+1 conditional
on θt. Finally, we denote the agent’s reference point at period t following the history
ht−1 by e(ht−1). We will say that the equilibrium is Markovian if players’ strategies
at (ht−1, θt) are purely a function of (θt−1, θt). We will say that the principal has a
unique equilibrium payoﬀ if there is a function V (θ) such that in any subgame perfect
equilibrium, the principal’s payoﬀ at the beginning of any period t, just before the
realization of θt, is V (θt−1).
Step 1: In subgame perfect equilibrium, for every (ht−1, θt) there is a reservation
wage w¯(ht−1, θt) < 1, such that the agent accepts every wt ≥ w¯(ht−1, θt).
Proof : If the agent rejects an oﬀer at t, his continuation payoﬀ is B(θt) =
E
£P
s≥t δ
s−tθs | θt
¤
. Recall that by assumption, θt < 1. Therefore, the agent will
strictly prefer to accept every wt ∈ (θt, 1). Suppose that the agent accepts some
wt ≤ θt after (ht−1, θt), but rejects some other w0t > wt. Given that the agent ac-
cepts wt, his payoﬀ must be weakly greater than max{B(θt), wt + δE(B(θt+1) | θt)}.
If he rejects w0t, his payoﬀ is by definition B(θt). Therefore, deviating to accepting w0t
would necessarily generate a payoﬀ of at least w0t + δE(B(θt+1) | θt), which is strictly
above B(θt), a contradiction. It follows that for every (ht−1, θt), there is a threshold
w¯(ht−1, θt) such that the agent accepts every wt ≥ w¯(ht−1, θt).
Step 2: Suppose that the principal has a unique equilibrium payoﬀ. Then,
wt(ht−1, θt) = max{w¯(ht−1, θt), e(ht−1)− λ}
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following every history (ht−1, θt).
Proof : By the definition of unique equilibrium payoﬀ, in any subgame perfect
equilibrium, the principal’s equilibrium payoﬀ in any subgame following some his-
tory ht (just before the realization of θt) is purely a function of θt−1. Suppose that
wt(ht−1, θt) > w¯(ht−1, θt) and wt(ht−1, θt) 6= e(ht−1)−λ after some history (ht−1, θt). If
the principal deviates to wt(ht−1, θt)− η, where η > 0 is arbitrarily small, he will not
change the agent’s output at t, and since the principal’s payoﬀ in the continuation game
will not change, the deviation has no implications for the principal’s continuation pay-
oﬀ. Therefore, the deviation is profitable. It follows that if wt(ht−1, θt) ≥ w¯(ht−1, θt),
then wt(ht−1, θt) ∈ {w¯(ht−1, θt), e(ht−1)−λ}. By the definition of e(ht−1) and the result
that w¯(ht−1, θt) < 1, it follows that e(ht−1) < 1. Therefore, the principal will always
choose wt(ht−1, θt) = max{w¯(ht−1, θt), e(ht−1) − λ} after every (ht−1, θt), because this
maximizes his period t payoﬀ, without aﬀecting his continuation payoﬀ.
Step 3: Suppose that the principal has a unique equilibrium payoﬀ. Then, in the
λ→ 0 limit, the equilibrium is uniquely defined as in the statement of the theorem.
Proof : Assume the premise holds. Then, by Step 2 and the definition of the
reference wage:
e(ht−1) =
Z
θt
max{w¯(ht−1, θt), e(ht−1)− λ}dF (θt | θt−1)
In the λ→ 0 limit, the solution to this equation is
e(ht−1) = max
θt|θt−1
w¯(ht−1, θt) (1)
By Step 2, the principal pays wt = e(ht−1) after every history (ht−1, θt), and by the
definition of w¯ the agent always accepts this oﬀer. The agent’s participation wage
w¯(ht−1, θt) is the wage that makes him indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting an
oﬀer following (ht−1, θt):
w¯(ht−1, θt) + E
"ÃX
s>t
δs−t max
θs|θs−1
w¯(hs−1, θs)
!
| θt
#
= B(θt)
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This can be rewritten as
w¯(ht−1, θt) = B(θt)− δ max
θt+1|θt
w¯(ht, θt+1)− δE
"ÃX
s>t+1
δs−t max
θs|θs−1
w¯(hs−1, θs)
!
| θt
#
= B(θt)− δ max
θt+1|θt
w¯(ht, θt+1)− δ
∙
EB(θt+1)−
Z
θt+1
w¯(ht, θt+1)dF (θt+1 | θt)
¸
which is simplified into the recursive functional equation
w¯(ht−1, θt) = θt − δ
∙
max
θt+1|θt
w¯(ht, θt+1)−
Z
θt+1
w¯(ht, θt+1)dF (θt+1 | θt)
¸
or
w¯(ht−1, θt) = θt + δE [w¯(ht, θt+1) | θt]− δ max
θt+1|θt
w¯(ht, θt+1) (2)
We claim that this functional equation has a unique solution. To show this, let
W be the set of all possible SPE reservation-wage functions. These are functions that
associate a real number with every history (ht−1, θt). The reservation wage is equal
to the outside option plus the discounted sum of future rents. Therefore, its value at
every history is bounded by some finite number (as the maximal rent that the principal
would pay at any period is less than 1). For every θt and function w ∈W , define
q(w) ≡ max
θt+1|θt
w(θt+1)− E[w(θt+1) | θt]
For any pair w,w0 ∈W define
d(w,w0) ≡ |q(w)− q(w0)|+ max
θt+1|θt
|w(ht, θt+1)− w0(ht, θt+1)|
It is straightforward to verify that d is a metric. Hence, (W,d) is a complete metric
space.
Let H(w) be a self-map on W defined by the R.H.S. of (2) (to economize on no-
tation, we suppress the dependence of w on the history (ht−1, θt)). This self-map is a
contraction in (W,d). To see this, note that for any pair w,w0 ∈W and for any history
(ht−1, θt),
q(H(w)) = q(H(w0)) = max
θt+1|θt
θt+1 − E(θt+1 | θt)
and
max
θt+1|θt
|H(w)−H(w0)| = δ|q(w)− q(w0)|
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It follows that
d(w,w0) =
d(H(w), H(w0))
δ
+ max
θt+1|θt
|w(ht, θt+1)− w0(ht, θt+1)|
Hence, for any δ < 1, there exists K < 1 such that d(H(w),H(w0)) < Kd(w,w0),
implying that H(w) is a contraction. Therefore, by the Banach Fixed Point Theorem,
there exists a unique fixed point w¯ = H(w¯), which means that the functional equation
(2) has a unique solution. Plug the definitions of e and w as in the statement of the
theorem into (1) and (2) to verify that they constitute a solution. Therefore, this must
be the unique solution.
Step 4: The principal has a unique equilibrium payoﬀ.
Proof : Consider first the lowest possible equilibrium principal’s payoﬀ. Then,
there must be a Markovian equilibrium that sustains it (because players can credibly
threaten to continue playing the same equilibrium after every deviation). Any Markov-
ian equilibrium must be characterized by the reservation wage w¯ that is given by (2).
As we saw in Step 3, there is a unique Markovian equilibrium, hence the lowest possible
equilibrium principal’s payoﬀ is uniquely pinned down by it. Next, we obtain an upper
bound on the principal’s equilibrium payoﬀs. Consider an auxiliary principal-agent
problem, in which the principal commits ex-ante to a wage strategy w as well as the
agent’s acceptance strategy a, subject to the participation constraint given by Step 1,
and the constraint that for every ht−1, et(ht−1) is consistent with the players’ strate-
gies. Clearly, a solution to this problem attains a payoﬀ weakly above any subgame
perfect equilibrium payoﬀ. However, since all continuation games that begin with the
same θt−1 are identical, there must be a Markovian solution to the problem. Since the
Markovian solution is unique, the upper bound on the principal’s equilibrium payoﬀ
coincides with the lower bound. It follows that there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium payoﬀ for the principal.
The unique equilibrium has several noteworthy properties. First, it is Markovian:
players follow a simple rule that depends only on θt (in the agent’s case) or θt−1 (in
the principal’s case). Second, the agent always produces an output of 1 along the
equilibrium path. Third, the equilibrium wage is rigid, or sluggish, in the sense that
it is totally unresponsive to the current shock εt. The wage at t is a weighted average
of the expected and maximal values of θt conditional on θt−1, where the weight on the
latter is 1− δ. Fourth, observe that if ε¯ is suﬃciently large and δ is suﬃciently close
to one, the agent’s participation wage can take negative values. However, his actual
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equilibrium wage is of course strictly positive. Finally, the agent earns an expected
discounted rent of ε¯, namely the diﬀerence between the maximal and expected values
of ε. As F is subjected to a mean preserving spread, ε¯ weakly increases, and thus
the agent’s rent goes up. The rent is independent of the discount factor: a higher δ
simply means greater smoothing of the rent over time. Our model thus establishes a
link between two phenomena: wage rigidity and eﬃciency wages, and it links them to
the fundamentals δ, ε¯.
Comment: The role of the assumption that λ→ 0
The assumption that λ > 0 is crucial for equilibrium uniqueness. If λ = 0, it is possible
to sustain equilibria in which the principal pays wt = et, where et can take any value
below 1 and above the highest participation wage that is possible given ht−1. In this
case, the agent’s wage (lagged) expectations are self-sustaining: the principal does not
wish to cut the wage below et because this would result in loss of output.
If λ were bounded away from 0, the equilibrium wage path would change as follows.
First, the reference wage et would be strictly below the maximal participation wage
that is possible given ht−1. As a result, the wage at t would cease to be purely a
function of θt−1: it would coincide with et at relatively low realizations of εt but it
would coincide with the (higher) participation wage at relatively high realizations of
εt. Second, the agent’s equilibrium rent would be lower than in the λ→ 0 limit. Since
our main objective in this note is to characterize the maximal rent that a reference-
dependent agent can get in his long-run relationship with the principal, we do not
provide a detailed characterization of this more general case.
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